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Summary
Humans and animals tend both to avoid uncertainty
and to prefer immediate over future rewards. The
comorbidity of psychiatric disorders such as impul-
sivity, problem gambling, and addiction suggests
that a common mechanism may underlie risk sensitiv-
ity and temporal discounting [1–6]. Nonetheless, the
precise relationship between these two traits remains
largely unknown [3, 5]. To examine whether risk sensi-
tivity and temporal discounting reflect a common
process, we recorded choices made by two rhesus
macaques in a visual gambling task [7] while we varied
the delay between trials. We found that preference for
the risky option declined with increasing delay be-
tween sequential choices in the task, even when all
other task parameters were held constant. These
results were quantitatively predicted by a model that
assumed that the subjective expected utility of the
risky option is evaluated based on the expected time
of the larger payoff [5, 6]. The importance of the larger
payoff in this model suggests that the salience of
larger payoffs played a critical role in determining
the value of risky options. These data suggest that
risk sensitivity may be a product of other cognitive
processes, and specifically that myopia for the future
and the salience of jackpots control the propensity
to take a gamble.
Results and Discussion
According to neoclassical economic theory, rational
decision makers should be indifferent when offered
a choice between a safe option and a risky option tender-
ing the same average expected payoff [8–10]. Econo-
mists and psychologists have long known, however,
that humans and animals deviate from this normative
ideal. Typically, choosers will pay a premium for the
safe option, although some individuals favor, and some
contexts increase the likelihood of, choosing the risky
alternative [7, 11–13]. Individuals may deviate from strict
rationality because of nonlinear internal representation
of risk [12, 14], nonlinear effects of payoffs on fitness
*Correspondence: hayden@neuro.duke.edu[15, 16], decreasing marginal utility of income [17], or
Weber’s law effects on discrimination of rewards [11, 18].
Just as individuals tend to systematically deviate from
normative ideals when choosing between risky options,
they also tend to undervalue, or discount, goods offered
at future times and impulsively favor small but immediate
gains [19–22]. Furthermore, time and risk both lead to hy-
perbolic discounting [3, 4]. The qualitative and quantita-
tive similarities between risk sensitivity and temporal
discounting suggest a common underlying mechanism
[1–6]. Dysfunctional decision making in a number of
neuropsychiatric disorders, such as addiction, problem
gambling, and impulsive behavior, also supports the
hypothesis that shared processes contribute to risk
sensitivity and temporal discounting.
On a single trial of a standard gambling task, the risky
option offers only a 50% chance of a large payoff, but if
the subject adopts a strategy of choosing the risky
option and sticks with it for a series of trials, the risky
strategy offers a virtually guaranteed large payoff, albeit
delayed. Thus, one way to understand the relationship
between risk sensitivity and temporal discounting is to
assume that future probabilistic rewards are construed
as certain rewards and discounted over time in the
same way as certain rewards [5, 6, 23]. This model
predicts that propensity to gamble should decrease as
delay between choices (typically determined by the
intertrial interval, ITI, in most experimental contexts)
increases. In a previous study, our lab demonstrated
that rhesus macaques strongly prefer the risky option
in a visual gambling task and, moreover, that risk seeking
increases with increasing variance in payoff of the risky
option [7]. In that study, monkeys made choices on aver-
age once every 3 s. Analogous studies in rats and birds,
however, have presented choices with much longer
delays between trials (normally 30 s) and found that
animals were risk averse. Similarly, studies of human
risk preferences often employ one-shot gambles—effec-
tively an infinite ITI—and most people also avoid the
risky option [11–13, 24]. These observations suggest
that temporal discounting may in fact explain much of
the variance in risk preference observed in different
studies.
Based on these considerations, we hypothesized that
risk preference in monkeys would vary systematically
with the delay between choices in which risk remained
constant. To test this hypothesis, we examined choices
made by rhesus monkeys performing a visual gambling
task (Figure 1) [7]. Monkeys sat in front of a computer
monitor and fixated a central ‘‘start’’ stimulus. Two iden-
tical choice targets then appeared, one on the left and
the other on the right. The ‘‘safe’’ target offered a guaran-
teed reward (150 ms solenoid open time of water) while
the ‘‘risky’’ target offered an even gamble between
a larger and a smaller reward (250 ms and 50 ms of
water). To encourage sampling of both locations, the
identity of the risky and safe targets was switched (with
no overt signal to the subjects) every 25 trials. Critically,
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50Figure 1. Structure of Visual Gambling Task
Each frame represents a stage of the trial.
Trial begins when fixation cue (small central
square) appears. Two response targets
appear on opposite sides of the fixation
spot. After a 1 s decision period, the central
cue is extinguished, indicating that gaze
must be shifted to either of the two targets
within 100 ms. After choice, all stimuli are ex-
tinguished and reward is delivered. Reward
was 150 ms of fluid for choice of the safe tar-
get and either 50 ms or 250 ms of fluid for the
risky target. After reward, the screen remains
blank for an intertrial interval (ITI) of variable
duration.we varied the time between choices by changing the ITI
randomly every 50–200 trials (ITIs: 1 s, 3 s, 6 s, 10 s, 12 s,
20 s, 30 s, 45 s, 60 s, 90 s). Monkeys typically performed
300–600 trials in a session.
We predicted that preference for the risky option
would systematically diminish with increasing time be-
tween choices. Figure 2 shows the average preference
for the risky option for both monkeys as a function of
ITI. As the delay between trials increased, preference
for the risky option systematically declined (logistic re-
gression on raw choice data, r = 0.0152, p < 0.0001).
The same inverse relationship between preference for
the risky option and ITI was observed in both monkeys
individually (monkey Niko, r = 0.0105, p < 0.0001; mon-
key Broome, r = 0.0220, p < 0.0001).
Figure 2. Increasing Time between Choices Reduces Preference for
Risk in Monkeys
Probability of choosing the risky target plotted as a function of inter-
trial interval (ITI) for two monkeys. As ITI becomes longer, risk prefer-
ence declines. Open circles show mean values, solid dots show one
standard error above and below the mean (calculated via bootstrap).
Solid line indicates best-fit linear regression, and its slope is signifi-
cantly negative (p < 0.0001). Dashed line indicates risk neutrality.If monkeys construe the risky option as offering a virtu-
ally certain large reward at a randomly varying future
time, then the subjective expected utility (SEU) of the
risky option will depend on the time at which the higher
payoff is expected. Because the expected large reward
may occur on a future trial, the SEU of the risky option
depends on the ITI. Thus, the hypothesis that monkeys
construe their decision as offering a virtually certain large
payoff at a variable future time leads to the hypothesis
that ITI, a factor beyond the scope of the current trial,
will influence the appeal of the risky option, and thus
change the probability that it will be chosen [5, 6, 23].
To test this hypothesis, we estimated SEUs for risky
options based on the expected delay until the payoff.
We assumed a hyperbolic discount function [19, 25]
with a discount factor (k) of 0.04, estimated from re-
sponses of rhesus macaques performing an intertem-
poral choice task for fluid rewards (K. Louie and P.
Glimcher, 2006, Soc. Neurosci., abstract). We used this
technique to estimate SEUs for the risky option at a range
of delays (solid curve in Figure 3). Note that the SEU for
the safe option was identical to its expected utility and
did not depend on ITI (150 ms, dashed line). We next
predicted behavioral choices from the calculated SEUs.
Earlier research in our lab demonstrated that choices
between two safe options depend on the ratio of their
values; the relationship between reward ratio and behav-
ioral choice was well approximated by a linear function
within the limits of the model [26]. With this information,
the predicted choice frequencies matched the observed
risk preferences remarkably well (Figure 3). Moreover,
the hyperbolic function gave a better fit to the data
than a linear model (average error = 6.4 ms and r2 =
0.86 for the hyperbolic model and 7.4 ms and r2 = 0.75
for the linear model). We note that our monkeys remained
risk neutral at the longest delay (90 s); we were unable to
test values beyond 90 s because the monkeys tended to
fall asleep during these longer intervals.
While students of animal behavior generally assume
that the form of the temporal discounting function is
hyperbolic, economists often describe it as exponential
[1], and some behavioral studies have suggested that
discounting may be exponential in monkeys as well
(J. Hwang and D. Lee, 2005, Soc. Neurosci., abstract).
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counting we assumed, we predicted risk preferences
with an exponential model of the form v0 = vekD. Although
the best-fit exponential model (k = 20.019, average
error = 10.5 ms, r2 = 0.73) was a poorer fit than the hyper-
bolic model, it did provide a qualitative match to the data.
Our data therefore are consistent with both forms of
temporal discounting.
To assess the validity of the assumed hyperbolic dis-
count parameter, k = 0.04, we tested the goodness of fit
of hyperbolic functions to the data assuming discount
parameters ranging from 0 to 1. We found that the dis-
count parameter that most closely fit the data was
0.033, very close to the assumed parameter of 0.04 (r2
for predictions associated with this k-value is 0.87).
The close agreement between this value and discount
parameters estimated in other studies of intertemporal
choice in primates (K. Louie and P. Glimcher, 2006,
Soc. Neurosci., abstract) [27] further supports this
model. We also note that this method offers a new tool
for calculating discount parameters without using an
explicit intertemporal choice procedure.
One potential confound that could account for our
results is that monkeys may forget the reward values
associated with the two targets as ITI increases. To con-
trol for this possibility, we performed an additional
experiment offering a choice between two close but dif-
ferent safe options (150 and 180 ms access to water). In
all other details, the methods of this experiment were the
same as those described in the experiment above. Mon-
keys strongly preferred the larger reward, and this pref-
erence did not depend on ITI (Figure 4). These results
demonstrate that monkeys can remember the payoffs
associated with each target for the longest durations
Figure 3. Temporal Discounting Predicts Risk Preferences in
Monkeys
Subjective expected utility (SEU) of risky target (left ordinate) as
a function of intertrial interval as estimated by the behavioral model
assuming hyperbolic discounting (see Experimental Procedures).
Probability of a risky choice is overlaid to facilitate comparison
(dots, right ordinate). The model predicts that the SEU of the risky
and safe targets will be equal with an ITI of 46 s. Behavioral data is
well fit by the model (r2 = 0.86, p = 0.0001). Note that the behavioral
data show a small tendency to deviate from the model data at very
short ITIs. Dotted line indicates predictions of best-fit exponential
model (see text). Dashed line indicates risk neutrality, and also
shows the predicted SEU of the safe target.we tested and that the observed decline in risk seeking
with increasing ITI cannot be explained by forgetting.
It is worth making explicit that two specific deviations
from rationality are inherent in the model we propose.
Besides hyperbolic discounting, the model suggests
that when evaluating the risky option, monkeys look for-
ward only until the next large payoff [5]. In focusing at-
tention on the jackpot, subjects overvalue the SEU of
the risky option. This overvaluation of large payoffs re-
sults in risk-seeking behavior at shorter ITIs. There is
no a priori reason why monkeys do not construe the
risky option as a series of large payoffs followed by
a small one; however, this would lead to increased risk
seeking with increasing ITIs, a choice pattern not ob-
served here.
More generally, it is worth making explicit that ours is
not the only model that could explain the data presented
here. Other models that could explain our results qualita-
tively include optimal foraging and state-dependant
models of risk [16, 18, 28]. In contrast to the model
proposed here, these models do not require subjective
devaluation of the future and thus do not invoke the
concept of subjective expected utility. Future research
will be needed to distinguish these models from the
proposed one.
Because human gamblers typically discount the fu-
ture more steeply than normal adults, it might be pre-
dicted that they would find gambling more aversive
than normals do. To resolve this well-known paradox,
it has been proposed that an increased salience of jack-
pots drives gamblers to find gambling more rewarding
than normals do, and that their steeper discount func-
tions drive them to prefer the immediate smaller rewards
of gambling to the longer rewards associated with
saving [5].
Conclusions
We demonstrated that risk sensitivity in rhesus monkeys
depends strongly on the time between subsequent
Figure 4. Effects of ITI on Risk Preference Does Not Reflect
Forgetting
Mean probability 0.66 (standard deviation 6 0.05) of a choosing
the larger reward for two monkeys plotted as a function of ITI in
a control experiment with two safe options of different value. Solid
dots show one standard error above and below the mean. There
was no significant effect of ITI on choice.
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52choices. These results indicate that contextual factors
that appear to be unrelated to the task at hand can sig-
nificantly influence reward-guided decision making. The
few studies directly investigating the role of ITI on
risk preference have obtained inconsistent results
[6, 14, 23], possibly a consequence of the abstract na-
ture of the monetary rewards used in those experiments.
The present results illustrate that contextual influences
on risk sensitivity are more general than previously
thought and extend beyond the horizon of the current
trial. Moreover, individual differences in risk sensitivity
may simply reflect differences in the discount factor
k, which could be specified genetically and manipulated
pharmacologically, thus offering new potential therapies
for problem gambling and addiction.
Experimental Procedures
Two adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) served as sub-
jects. Subjects were on controlled access to fluid outside of exper-
imental sessions; they earned roughly 80% of their total daily fluid
ration during experimental sessions. All procedures were approved
by the Duke University Medical Center Institutional Animal Care and
Use Committee and complied with the Public Health Service’s Guide
for the Care and Use of Animals.
A standard desktop computer controlled experiments and
recorded data with custom software (Gramalkyn, http://
ryklinsoftware.com). Stimuli were presented on a 21’’ Sony Trinitron
monitor (10243 768 resolution; 60 Hz refresh) placed directly in front
of the monkey chair, 45 cm away. Stimuli were small yellow squares
subtending approximately 1 of visual angle. All stimuli were pre-
sented on a dark background. Eye position was monitored at 500
Hz with a scleral search coil implanted with standard techniques
described previously [29] or with an Eyelink 1000 Camera System
(SR Research, Osgoode, ON, Canada).
A standard solenoid valve controlled the duration of water deliv-
ery. As in previous studies, we calibrated the water delivery system
to ensure that reward volume was linearly proportional to valve open
time [7]. Trials began when the monkey acquired fixation on a central
square. When fixation had been achieved and maintained for 1 s,
two response targets (yellow squares identical to the fixation cue)
appeared at eccentric locations on opposite sides of the visual field.
They were usually 15 to the left and right of the central square,
although they were sometimes placed at 15 above and below the
center, or at oblique orientations. The locations used did not affect
choice.
After 1 s, the central fixation square was extinguished, and the
monkey had 100 ms to shift gaze to either of the two targets. Mon-
keys were rewarded with water delivered from a solenoid valve.
The volume of water was linearly proportional to solenoid open
time, and 150 ms provided 0.023 ml of water [7]. One target offered
a ‘‘safe’’ option (150 ms of water), while the other offered a ‘‘risky’’
option (50% chance of 50 ms of water and 50% chance of 250 ms
of water). The smaller option was set at 50 ms so that monkeys
would be rewarded in all conditions. Based on previous results,
we hypothesized that had we used 300 ms and 0 ms as the two risky
possibilities, behavior would have been qualitatively similar, but that
risk seeking would have been stronger [7]. There was no overt cue
indicating which target was risky and which was safe. To encourage
foraging, the risky and safe sides were switched (with no cue given
to the subjects) every 25 trials.
After delivery of the reward, all stimuli were removed, and the
monitor was left blank for a specified duration (intertrial interval,
ITI). ITIs were drawn randomly from a pool of values (1 s, 3 s, 6 s,
10 s, 12 s, 20 s, 30 s, 45 s, 60 s, 90 s) and varied in blocks of
50–200 trials. Monkeys were tested a total of 3860, 1943, 2291,
842, 607, 591, 1016, 112, 476, and 178 trials in each condition,
respectively. To minimize the possibility that changes in observed
risk preference on different days would cause spurious changes in
risk preference, we presented blocks of each ITI in a random order,
and we tried to present as many ITIs as possible each day. We wereable to present at least six blocks each day, and on half the days, we
presented all ten. The length of each block was chosen arbitrarily,
and the sequence of blocks was randomized. We also performed
a control experiment in which both options offered safe payoffs. In
this experiment, one target offered 150 ms of reward and the other
offered 180. As in the other experiment, the identity of the two
targets switched every 25 trials. In this experiment, we used only
seven ITIs (1 s, 3 s, 6 s, 10 s, 30 s, 60 s, 90 s). In all experiments,
monkeys typically earned around 300 ml of water in an experimental
session.
The Model
We used a model assuming monkeys evaluate the discounted re-
ward associated with the next large payoff to determine the subjec-
tive expected utility (SEU) of the risky option. That is, in the model,
there is a 50% chance of an immediate large (250 ms) payoff and
a 50% chance of a deferred large payoff. (The model explicitly as-
sumes that the risky choice is evaluated as if the risky choice would
be consistently chosen on all future trials.) On the deferred payoff
trials, there is a 50% chance that a large payoff will occur after
only one trial (plus ITI), and a 50% chance that the large payoff will
be further delayed. This thought process may be extended out infi-
nitely. To determine the SEU of the risky option, we calculated the
first 100 terms of the infinite series. This process sums each possible
outcome multiplied by its probability. Each outcome is defined as
the average of the discounted payoffs for all trials up to and includ-
ing the first large payoff. In practice, we assume the brain estimates
the SEU of each option based on experienced rewards and the
intervening intervals [30].
We calculated the discounted utilities with a hyperbolic discount
function of the form v0 = v/(1 + kD), where v0 refers to the discounted
utility, v refers to the objective value (in ms of fluid), k refers to the
discount parameter, and D refers to the delay (in seconds) until the
payoff is offered [19]. We used a discount parameter k of 0.04
(K. Louie and P. Glimcher, 2006, Soc. Neurosci., abstract). The
immediate payoff was assumed to have a delay of 0 s and the sub-
sequent payoffs had a delay of (3 + ITI)*n, where n refers to the trial
number in the future, and 3 refers to the average duration of the trial
itself. We do not suppose that the monkeys explicitly follow our
method to evaluate SEUs, but merely that they use cognitive strate-
gies that produce the same results as this method.
To calculate the accuracy of the exponential discounting model,
we used the standard exponential discounting equation, v0 = vekD.
We then obtained the best-fit parameters for this model, which
provided a value of k = 20.019.
To predict choice probability as a function of SEU, we applied the
results of earlier research performed in our lab showing a roughly
linear relationship between the relative value of two options in
a decision-making task and choice probability [26]. These data
(collected on the same two monkeys used in the present experi-
ment) show that in the range of values used in this experiment,
choice probability is well approximated by a linear function of the
ratio of the two options, specifically, p = (ratio 2 0.4) * 5.
Supplemental Data
Supplemental Data include two figures and Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures and can be found with this article online at
http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/17/1/49/DC1/.
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